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1. General considerations 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) was adopted in 1950 within the framework of the Council of Europe 
and nowadays legally binds 47 States,2 granting effective human rights protection and, 
in particular, guaranteeing respect for the family life of almost 800 million people.3 
The importance and originality of the ECHR lies on its extended catalogue of 
human rights and also on the monitoring mechanisms that are provided for the 
enforcement of such rights. Such mechanisms are based on a jurisdictional organ - the 
European Court of Human Rights (Eur. Ct. H.R.)4. This system has built a standard of 
protection of human rights which is higher than the standard established by the 
International community in general.    
                                                 
1
 The instant paper corresponds to the communication presented, on the 5th of June of 2010, at the AFCC 
47th Annual Conference – Traversing the Trail of Alienation: Rocky Relationships, Mountains of  
emotion, Mile High Conflict, Denver, USA. 
2
 The Council of Europe, based in Strasbourg, was founded on 5 May 1949 by ten countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and UK). In August 1949, 
Greece and Turkey joined this organization. Currently, many other countries are also part of the Council 
of Europe, namely, by date of accession: Iceland and Germany (1950), Austria (1956), Cyprus (1961), 
Switzerland (1963), Malta (1965), Portugal (1976), Spain (1977), Liechtenstein (1978), San Marino 
(1988), Finland (1989), Hungary (1990), Poland (1991), Bulgaria (1992), Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania (1993), Andorra (1994), Albania, Latvia, Moldova, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine (1995), Russian Federation and Croatia (1996), Georgia (1999), 
Armenia and Azerbaijan (2001), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2002), Serbia (2003), Monaco (2004) and 
Montenegro (2007). 
3
 In general, on the ECHR, see, inter alia, D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, (Oxford University Press, 2009) [hereinafter HARRIS, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN]; PIETER 
VAN DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, (Kluwer 
Law International 2006) [hereinafter DIJK, THEORY AND PRACTICE]; FRÉDÉRIC SUDRE, DROIT EUROPÉEN 
ET INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (Presses Universitaires de France 2005) [hereinafter SUDRE, 
DROIT EUROPÉEN]; CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford University Press 2002); SERGIO BARTOLE ET AL., COMMENTARIO ALLA 
CONVENZIONE EUROPEA PER LA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO E DELLE LIBERTÀ FONDAMENTALI 
(CEDAM 2001); BLACKBURN & POLAKIEWICZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 1995-2000 (Oxford University Press 2001); 
DAVID J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Butterworths 1995). 
4
 The Court was instituted as a permanent entity with full-time judges on 1 November 1998, replacing the 
then existing enforcement mechanisms, which included the European Commission of Human Rights 
created in 1954 and the European Court of Human Rights, which had been created in 1959. The new 
format of the Court was the result of the ratification of Protocol No. 11, an amendment to the Convention 
that was ratified in November 1998. 
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Every State that ratifies the ECHR becomes bound by the jurisdiction of the 
Court. The Court consists in a number of judges equal to that of the States Parties to the 
Convention (Article 20 ECHR). Nevertheless, the judges are not representatives from 
the States Parties, performing their duties with independence and impartiality.  
Any Contracting State5 or individual6 claiming to be a victim of a violation of 
the Convention may lodge directly with the Eur. Ct. H.R an application alleging a 
breach by a Contracting State of one of the Convention rights.  
The procedure before the Eur. Ct. H.R is adversarial and public. Firstly, the 
individual and the State enjoy absolute procedural equality. Secondly, hearings, which 
are held only in a minority of cases, are public, unless the Court decides otherwise on 
account of exceptional circumstances. Memorials and other documents filed with the 
Court’s Registry by the parties are, in principle, accessible to the public (Article 40 
ECHR).  
The procedure before the Court is provided with a mechanism for the filtering of 
applications and a procedure to enable friendly settlements. 
To consider cases brought before it, the Court sits in a single-judge formation, in 
committees of three judges, in Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand Chamber of 
seventeen judges (Article 26 ECHR). 
A single judge7 may declare inadmissible or strike out of the Court’s list of cases 
an application where such a decision can be taken without further examination, for 
example because of inadmissibility of the application8. These decisions are final. If the 
                                                 
5
 Any Contracting State may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention 
and the protocols thereto by another Contracting Party (Article 33 ECHR). 
6
 The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the Contracting States (Article 34 ECHR). 
7
 When sitting as a single judge, a judge shall not examine any application against the High Contracting 
Party in respect of which that judge has been elected (Article 26 (3) ECHR). 
8
 Article 35 of the ECHR sets forth the admissibility criteria. Firstly, the Court may only deal with the 
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted and within a period of six months from the date 
on which the final decision was taken. Only those domestic remedies that are likely to be effective, 
adequate and available shall be taken into account. Furthermore, the Court shall not deal with any 
application that is anonymous or is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by 
the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement 
and contains no relevant new information. It also considers inadmissible those applications that are 
manifestly ill-founded, or that constitute an abuse of the right of application. Finally, the applications that 
are incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the protocols thereto shall be dismissed as well. 
An application is so considered if it is incompatible ratione temporis (the Convention is not binding on 
the State at the time of the events complained of), incompatible ratione loci (the complaint relates to a 
place where the Convention is not binding), incompatible ratione personae (the complaint relates to a 
person not bound by the Convention, or over whom the organs do not have jurisdiction) or incompatible 
ratione materiae (the complaint relates to a right not protected by the Convention). Finally, the Court 
shall declare inadmissible an application where the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage 
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single judge does not take such decisions, the application shall be forwarded to a 
committee or to a Chamber for further examination (Article 27 ECHR). 
A committee may, on one hand, declare the application inadmissible or strike it 
out of its list of cases, where such decision can be taken without further examination (in 
which case the decision is final). On the other hand, it may declare the application 
admissible and render a judgment on the merits, if the underlying question in the case is 
already the subject of well-established case-law of the Court. If none of these decisions 
is taken, the application proceeds to the Chambers (Article 28 ECHR)9. 
 Chambers determine both admissibility and merits (Article 29 ECHR). The first 
stage of the procedure is generally written, although the Chamber may decide to hold a 
public hearing. The President may invite or grant leave to any Contracting State which 
is not party to the proceedings, or any person concerned who is not the applicant, to 
submit written comments, and, in exceptional circumstances, to make representations at 
the hearing. A Contracting State whose national is an applicant in the case is entitled to 
intervene as of right (Article 36 ECHR). During the procedure on the merits, 
negotiations aimed at securing a friendly settlement may be conducted through the 
Registrar10. Such negotiations are confidential (Article 38 ECHR).  
Chambers decide by a majority vote. Any judge who has taken part in the 
consideration of the case is entitled to append to the judgment a separate opinion. A 
Chamber’s judgment becomes final on expiry of the three-month period and shall be 
published (Article 44 ECHR). Reasons shall be given for judgments as well as for 
decisions declaring applications admissible or inadmissible (Article 45 ECHR). 
Chambers may at any time relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand 
Chamber where a case raises a serious question of interpretation of the Convention or 
where there is a risk of departing from existing case-law, unless one of the parties 
objects to such relinquishment (Article 30 ECHR). Also, within a period of three 
months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to the case may, in 
exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber (Article 43 
ECHR). The Grand Chamber decides by a majority vote and its judgments are final.  
                                                                                                                                               
(unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an 
examination of on the merits). 
9
 The committee decides by a unanimous vote. 
10
 If a friendly settlement is effected, the Court shall strike the case out of its list by means of a decision 
which shall be confined to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached (Article 39). 
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All final judgments of the Court are binding on the respondent States concerned, 
and responsibility for supervising the execution of judgments lies with the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe (Article 46 ECHR)11. The Contracting States that 
are parties to a case are in principle free to choose the means whereby they will comply 
with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach. If the nature of the breach 
allows of restitutio in integrum, it is for the respondent State to enforce it. If, on the 
other hand, national law does not allow – or allows only partial – reparation to be made 
for the consequences of the breach, the Article 50 empowers the Court to afford the 
injured party such satisfaction as appears to be appropriate12. Sometimes the Court 
specifies the measures that the States must adopt in order to comply with a judgment. 
Such measures may be individual or general (e. g., amendment of domestic legislation). 
Only the parties to the process are bound by the Court decisions. Nevertheless, since the 
decisions of the Court are meant to interpret the ECHR provisions, they acquire an 
autonomous authority that has influence on all the States Parties. All of them have to 
respect the ECHR provisions with the interpretation given by the Court. In several 
occasions, some States Parties have amended domestic statutes in order to respect the 
latest decisions of the Eur. Ct. H.R. Also the domestic courts, including the 
constitutional jurisdictions take the Eur. Ct. H.R case-law in consideration. 
The Eur. Ct. H.R is a unique institution in the world, since it works in a 
permanent basis and has broad powers, like investigation and sentence. Until 1998 
claims were also decided by the now-defunct European Commission of Human Rights 
(Eur. Comm’n H.R.). Thus, some of the cases mentioned below were issued by that 
organ. 
 
2. The right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
The respect for private and family life is a fundamental right protected in the 
ECHR under Article 8. This provision aims essentially to prevent any arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities in the private and family sphere of every 
individual.  
Article 8 ECHR reads as follows: 
                                                 
11
 Nevertheless, this body cannot force States to comply, and the ultimate sanction for non-compliance is 
expulsion from the Council of Europe. 
12
 Papamichalopoulos v. Greece 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993). All the ECHR decisions may be found at 
http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
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1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
This provision possesses a dual structure: the first paragraph defines the scope of 
the protected right and the second paragraph lays down on which grounds Member 
States may legitimately interfere with the enjoyment of such right. 
The first step that the Eur. Ct. H.R. has to take in Article 8 ECHR claims is to 
analyse whether the relationship described by the applicant can be characterized as 
“family life”, as only in that case will the situation fall under the scope of this provision. 
After that, the Eur. Ct. H.R. will determine whether there has been an interference with 
the right to respect for family life or if the Member State had a positive obligation and 
failed to act. Lastly, if concluding that there was such an interference or omission, the 
Eur. Ct. H.R. will examine whether it was justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 and, 
accordingly, whether it was in accordance to the law, necessary in a democratic society 
or pursued any of the legitimate aims set out in this paragraph.       
The vagueness of the expression “respect for private and family life” has raised 
considerable interpretive problems in the case-law of the Eur. Ct. H.R. Also, 
considering that the ECHR is “a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light 
of present day conditions”13, the Eur. Ct. H.R. has clearly opted for a dynamic or 
evolutive interpretation. Thus, it has dynamically interpreted the coexisting concepts of 
“private life” and “family life”. In addition, the dynamic interpretation of the term 
“respect” has let the Court to read into Article 8 not only traditional, negative 
obligations (by which a Member State must abstain from interfering with the enjoyment 
of this right to private and family life), but also positive obligations, namely 
                                                 
13
 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 31 (1978). See also, mutatis mutandis, Marckx v. 
Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 41 (1979); Rees v. the United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 47 
(1986); Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 53 (1986); Christine Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R § 75.  
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substantive14 and procedural15 (by which a Contracting State must take action to secure 
the enjoyment of the right enshrined).  
If the Eur. Ct. H.R has shown great generosity in granting legal protection to 
new forms of “family life” by interpreting extensively paragraph 1 of Article 8 ECHR, 
the same is not true regarding to paragraph 2, where the Strasbourg Court has been 
particularly deferential to the Contracting States, allowing a wide margin of 
appreciation from the States in assessing the necessity of an interference with the right 
guaranteed.16  
As already alluded above, in assessing an alleged violation of Article 8, the 
Court begins by investigating if the relationship described by the applicant constitutes 
“family life”. Since the authors of the Convention did not define the concept of “family” 
or the concept of “family life”, it is for the Strasbourg Court to determine case-by-case 
what constitutes a “family” under the Convention.  
In this process of construction of the concept of “family life” under Article 8, the 
Eur. Ct. H.R begins by pointing out that a lawful and genuine marriage undoubtedly 
gives rise to family life.17  In addition, generally, the relationship between parents and 
their children constitutes family life starting from the moment of birth and by the very 
fact of it, regardless of being a child born in or out of wedlock.18  
The notion of family under this provision “may encompass de facto ‘family’ ties 
where the parties are living together outside of marriage”19, as long as the ties are 
sufficiently close and effective.20 Several relevant factors may be considered in order to 
demonstrate that the relationship invoked by the applicant has sufficient constancy to 
                                                 
14
 For example, to legally recognise the family relationship between an unmarried mother and her child 
born out of wedlock, as in Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
15
 For example, to ensure that natural fathers intervene in the adoption’s decision-making process of their 
children, as in Keegan v. Ireland, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994), or to ensure the sufficient involvement of 
parents in the decision-making process leading to the taking of their children into public care, as in W. v. 
the United Kingdom, 121 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1987).  
16
 For instance, in the case X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997-II Eur. Ct. H.R., although the Eur. 
Ct. H.R. considered that there was family life between a female-to-male transsexual, his female partner 
and her child born by artificial insemination, it stressed the lack of any common European standard with 
regard to the granting of parental rights to transsexuals when reasoning about the State’s failure to allow 
the female-to-male transsexual to be registered as the father of that child and, therefore, decided that there 
had been no violation of Article 8.  
17
 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 62 (1985).  
18
 Keegan v. Ireland, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 44 (1994). 
19
 Keegan v. Ireland, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 44 (1994). See, mutatis mutandis, Kroon and Others v. 
the Netherlands, 297-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 30 (1994); Elsholz v. Germany, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 
43; Lebbink v. the Netherlands, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. § 34. 
20
 Moreover, for the purposes of Article 8, no distinction should be made between families based on 
matrimony and those that are not, as a different standpoint would be contrary to Article 14. See Marckx v. 
Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 31 (1979). 
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create “family life”, e. g., whether the couple live together,21 the length of their 
relationship,22 whether they have demonstrated their commitment to each other by 
having children together23, whether there are elements of financial and/or psychological 
dependency involving more than normal emotional ties24, or even whether there is 
regular visits by the parent.25  
Consistent with this, and according to the Eur. Ct. H.R, “family life” may 
embrace stable heterosexual relationships, as well as biological ties between a parent 
and a child, whether they arise from a mono-parental,26 a bi-parental27 or an adulterous28 
relationship, as long as the ties are sufficiently close and effective. For the Eur. Ct. 
H.R., “the existence or non-existence of ‘family life’ is essentially a question of fact 
depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties”.29 
Relationships between near relatives, as those between siblings,30 or between 
grandparents and grandchildren31, or even between uncles/aunts and nephews/nieces,32 
may likewise fall within the protective scope of Article 8.33    
                                                 
21
 See Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 56, 72 (1986); Keegan v. Ireland, 290 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 45 (1994). It should be noted, however, that the European Court considers that 
cohabitation is not always necessary. For example, in Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) § 21 (1988), the Court held that “family life” existed even if the parents were not living together at the 
time of the child’s birth. Furthermore, the fact that after the divorce or breakup not all members of the 
family live together any more does not put an end to their family life nor constitutes an obstacle to its 
creation. In Elsholz v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), e.g., although the parents were no longer living 
together, the father maintained regular contact with his son and, accordingly, the Court considered that 
there was “family life” between them.      
22
 See, e.g., Quintana Zapata v. Spain, App. No. 34615/97, 92-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 139 
(1998) (holding that a more uxorio relationship that lasted 65 years constituted undoubtedly “family 
life”).   
23
 See, e.g., Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, 297-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (considering that 
although the couple had never live together, they had a long-standing relationship and had four children 
and therefore the Court found that they had “family life” within the scope of Article 8).     
24
 See, e.g., Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 37 (2007), (founding “additional factors of 
dependence other than normal ties of affection”, since the first applicant, due to a serious illness that left 
her paraplegic, needed to be cared by her biological mother and her adoptive father, respectively second 
and third applicants).    
25
 Gül v. Switzerland, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. § 33 
26
 Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 31 (1979). 
27
 McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 307-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995). 
28
 Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, 297-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). 
29
 See Brauer v. Germany, § 30). 
30
 See, e.g., Moustaquim v. Belgium, 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991), (stating that there was “family 
life” between the applicant and his siblings). 
31
 See, e.g., Vermeire v. Belgium, 214-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991) (concerning the exclusion of a 
grandchild from the estate of a grandparent solely because of the “illegitimate” nature of the affiliation 
between them).  
32
 See, e.g., Boyle v. the United Kingdom, 282-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (where the applicant 
complained about the denial of access to his nephew, who had been taken into public care, because 
British law did not envisage this possibility). 
33
 In this regard, the Court held in the Marckx Judgment that “family life”, in the sense of Article 8, 
“includes at least the ties between near relatives, for instance those between grandparents and 
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With regard to recomposed families, the Eur. Ct. H.R. found, e.g., in K. and T. v. 
Finland, that family ties, within the meaning of Article 8, included the relationship 
between a child and his social father, who was living with the biological mother of that 
same child.34  
The notion of “family life”, in the Strasbourg Court’s view, also comprises the 
link between adoptive parents and their adoptive children.35  
The Eur. Ct. H.R. has also combined the “sufficiently close interpersonal ties” 
factor to the “appearance of a family” factor, in order to determine the existence of 
“family life” between people not bound by blood, marriage or adoption.36 By way of 
example, in X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, the Eur. Ct. H.R. stated that de facto 
family ties linked X, a female-to-male transsexual, who had undergone gender 
reassignment surgery, Y, a woman, with whom X had lived for 18 years to all 
appearances as her male partner, and Z, Y’s child as a result of artificial insemination by 
a donor. In fact, the Court noted that in this case there was a clear social appearance of a 
traditional family, since both X and Y had applied jointly for treatment by artificial 
insemination, and X had been involved throughout that process and had play the role of 
Z’s “father” in every respect since his birth.37     
In short, in the case of married couples and children who are born in or out of 
wedlock, and in the case of other close family relationships, the genuineness of the 
family ties is presumed, even if subject to proof to the contrary. Thus, while the mere 
existence of a biological link may not be sufficient to trigger the protection granted by 
Article 8, the absence of biological ties does not preclude the existence of family life, as 
long as either the “sufficiently close interpersonal ties” or the “appearance of a family” 
criterion is verified. 
And what does not constitute family life under Article 8? 
                                                                                                                                               
grandchildren, since such relatives may play a considerable part in the family”. See Marckx v. Belgium, 
31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 45 (1979). 
34
 K. and T. v. Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§149, 150 (2001). 
35
 Pini, Bertani and Others v. Romania, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 146, 148. In fact, in this case the Court 
favoured a simple link, arising from a lawful and genuine adoption, over the close de facto ties factor, 
since, although there was no cohabitation nor development of sufficiently de facto close ties between 
adopted children and adoptive parents before or after the adoption orders, the simple “potential relation”, 
arising from a lawful and genuine adoption, was already worthy of the protection granted by Article 8.  
36
 Sudre, Frédéric Sudre, Rapport Introductif – La “construction” par le juge européen du droit au 
respect de la vie familiale, in LE DROIT AU RESPECT DE LA VIE FAMILIALE AU SENS DE LA CONVENTION 
EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 11, 21 (Frédéric Sudre ed., Bruylant 2002) [hereinafter Sudre, 
Raport Introductif]. 
37
 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997-II Eur. Ct. H.R §§ 35-37. 
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The protective shield of Article 8 does not encompass the mere desire to found a 
family, either by marrying38, or having the opportunity to adopt children39. Moreover, 
the European Commission of Human Rights took the view that the sperm donor “that 
donates sperm only to enable a woman to become pregnant through artificial 
insemination does not of itself give the donor a right to respect for family life with the 
child”.40 Moreover, a relationship between a fiancé and fiancée does not in itself 
constitute “family life”41. Polygamous marriages may create “family life”, 
notwithstanding the fact that it does not seem to be an obligation to afford them 
protection under Article 8 in all circumstances42. Finally, as regards homosexual 
relationships, considering the different views of the Member States in relation to this 
issue, they are yet to be protected as “family life”. The Convention institutions have, 
indeed, reiterated that “despite the modern evolution of attitudes towards 
homosexuality”, a stable homosexual relationship between two women or two men does 
not give rise to family life and hence does not fall within the scope of the right to 
respect for family life, granting them, nevertheless, protection under the concept of 
“private life”.43 
The uncertainty and the coexistence of the concepts of “privacy” and “family” in 
Article 8 has also led the Court to blur the boundary between them, which resulted, on 
numerous occasions, in the emergency of the nebulous concept of “respect for private 
and family life”, including the right to establish and develop interpersonal relations. 
This broad interpretation of the right to respect for private and family life has 
undoubtedly permitted the extension of the protective shield of this provision and, 
therefore, also ensured its vitality. However, this approach has equally led to a 
progressive dilution of the specificity and precise boundaries of the concept of “family 
life”.44  
                                                 
38
 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 62 (1985). 
39
 Fretté v. France, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R § 32 (recalling, when called to rule on adoption by single 
homosexuals, that the Convention does not guarantee the right to adopt as such and, in addition, 
emphasizing that “the right to respect for family life presupposes the existence of a family and does not 
safeguard the mere desire to found a family”).  See also E.B. v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R.  § 41 (2008).   
40
 J.R.M. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 16944/90, 74 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 120 (1993). 
41
 Wakefield v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 11373/85, 66 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 225 (1990). 
42
 See, e.g., E.A. and A.A v. the Netherlands, App. No. 14501/89, 72 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 118 
(1992) and Alam and Khan v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 2991/66, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 788 
(Eur. Comm’n H.R.). 
43
 See, e.g., Röösli v. Germany, App. No. 28318/95, 85-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 149, 151 
(1996).   
44
 For more details about the evolutionary case-to-case construction of the concept of “family life”, see, 
inter alia, SUSANA ALMEIDA, O RESPEITO PELA VIDA (PRIVADA E) FAMILIAR NA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DO 
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Finally, and now regarding more specifically the cases of family disruption, 
according to the Strasbourg Court, the right to respect for family life, within the 
meaning of Article 8, requires a positive obligation of Member States to act in a manner 
calculated to allow family ties to develop normally.45 Furthermore, as this Court often 
stresses, the mutual enjoyment by parents and children of each other’s company 
constitutes a fundamental element of family life and thus one of the objectives pursued 
by Article 8.46 
Therefore, the restriction or non-enforcement of custody and access rights, as 
well as the compulsory taking of children into public care and the implementation of 
care measures, or the limitation or prohibition of visits from family members to 
prisoners, or even the refusal of family reunification of immigrants, represent an 
interference with the right to respect for family life under Article 8. In the following 
paragraphs we shall analyse these cases of family disruption and examine under which 
grounds, according to this organ, Member States may legitimately interfere with the 
enjoyment of the right to respect for family life. 
 
3. Custody and Access 
In the significant amount of applications concerning the relationship of parents 
and children on marriage breakdown or other family crises, the Strasbourg organs have 
emphasised that divorce or separation of the parents do not put an end to family life of 
parents with their children47 and therefore family ties between them must be preserved. 
Thus, the award of custody to one parent, the restriction, exclusion, or non-enforcement 
                                                                                                                                               
TRIBUNAL EUROPEU DOS DIREITOS DO HOMEM: A TUTELA DAS NOVAS FORMAS DE FAMÍLIA, (Coimbra 
Editora, 2009), Hans Danelius, Reflections on some important Judgements of the European Court of 
Human Rights regarding family life, in FAMILY LIFE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 153 (Peter Lødrup & Eva 
Modvar ed.,  Gyldendal 2004); GILLES DUTERTRE, KEY CASE – LAW EXTRACTS: EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 268-93 (Council of Europe Publishing 2003); WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, supra 3, at 
217-24; Sudre, Raport Introductif, supra 36, at 11-54; DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 239-253 (Council of 
Europe Publishing 1999); Jane Liddy, Current topic: the concept of family life under ECHR, 1 EUR. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 15 (1998); David Feldman, The developing scope of Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 265 (1997); Vincent Coussirat-Coustère, La notion de 
famille dans les jurisprudences de la Commission et de la Cour européennes des droits de l’Homme, in 
INTERNATIONALISATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET ÉVOLUTION DU DROIT DE LA FAMILLE 45 (1996).   
45
 See, inter alia, Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 45 (1979); Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 
2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 221. 
46
 See, e. g., Keegan v. Ireland, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 50 (1994); Margareta and Roger Andersson v. 
Sweden, 226 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 72 (1992); Elsholz v. Germany, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 43; 
Kutzner v. Germany, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. § 58. 
47
 Inter alia, Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 21 (1988); Elsholz v. Germany, 
2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 43. 
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of visiting rights and the non-enforcement of custody in cases of abduction constitute an 
interference with the right to respect for family life, which may be, in certain cases and 
as we shall see, legitimate under paragraph 2 of Article 8. Furthermore, as the Court has 
repeatedly held either in cases of non-enforcement of access rights or in cases of child 
abduction, Article 8 includes a right for parents to have measures taken by the national 
authorities in a manner calculated to enable family ties to be developed normally and 
that will permit them to be reunited with their children.48 In the Court’s analysis a fair 
balance between the interests of all persons concerned and the general interest in 
ensuring respect for the rule of law must be stroke.49  
The award of the custody to one parent will inevitably constitute an interference 
with the family life of the other parent and, although the conventional organs consider 
that “the terms of paragraph 2 leave a considerable measure of discretion to the 
domestic courts when deciding on questions concerning the custody of the children of 
divorced parents”,50 a right of access will derive from Article 8 to the non-custodial 
parent.51 In fact, the non-custodial parent can only be prevented from access to the child 
if very serious reasons laid down on the second paragraph of Article 8 are put forward, 
such as the protection of health and morals of children, namely their psychological well-
being.52 Besides, all difference in treatment regarding access rights between divorced 
parents and natural parents of children born outside marriage without an objective and 
reasonable justification is discriminatory and thus condemned by the European Judge.53 
The equality principle between mother and father should also guide the national 
authorities’ decision in awarding parental rights. Therefore, in the Court’s opinion, a 
                                                 
48
 See, e. g., Eriksson v. Sweden, 156 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 71 (1989); Margareta and Roger Andersson 
v. Sweden, 226-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 91 (1992); Olsson v. Sweden (No. 2), 250 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) § 90 (1992); Hokkanen v. Finland, 299-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 55 (1994); Ignaccolo-Zenide v. 
Romania, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. § 94; Sophia Gudrun Hansen v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 97 (2003). 
49
 Nuutinen v. Finland, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 129. 
50
 X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 2699/65, 11 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 366, 376 
(1968). Moreover, as the Strasbourg Court noted in Hokkanen v. Finland, 299-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 
55 (1994), this Court's “task is not to substitute itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their 
responsibilities regarding custody and access issues, but rather to review, in the light of the Convention, 
the decisions taken by those authorities in the exercise of their power of appreciation”. 
51
 See, e. g., Hendriks v. the Netherlands, App. No. 8427/78, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5 § 94 
(1982). 
52See, e.g., Jonsson v. Sweden, App. No. 12495/86, 54 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 194, 199 (1987) 
(where, given the serious difficulties and conflicts between parents, the refusal of a natural father’s right 
of access to his child was considered a justified interference with his right to respect for his family life, 
because it was important for the child’s well-being to be kept out of those difficulties) and Schaal v. 
Luxembourg, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 50-53 (2003) (finding that the interests of the child justified suspending 
the applicant’s access rights and the interference with his right to respect for his family life while waiting 
for the outcome of the criminal trial against him for sexual abuses). 
53
 See, for instance, Sahin and Sommerfeld v. Germany, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R.  
Family disruption in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
12 
decision based essentially in religion54 or sexual orientation55 of the parent alone 
encompasses a violation of Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the 
Convention. 
On the other hand, rocky relationships between separated or divorced parents or 
between parents and other relatives may often lead to conflicting problems or obstacles 
on access to children by the non-custodial parent. In general, considering the national 
authorities’ obligation to act in manner calculated to allow family ties to develop and to 
take measures that will enable parent and child to be reunited, the non-enforcement of a 
parent’s right to access to its child against the person who is refusing to comply with 
court orders may constitute a violation of Article 8. 
For instance, in Hokkanen v. Finland, the Strasbourg Court upheld that the 
State’s failure to implement a father’s right to access to his daughter against the denial 
of the maternal grandparents to comply with court orders was contrary to his right to 
respect for his family life.56   
Nevertheless, the Court will not find a violation of Article 8 if the Member State 
has made good faith efforts to enforce the access rights awarded under a court order and 
the principle obstacle to the parent-child contact is the opposition and resistance of the 
custodial parent.57 
Similarly, and having in mind the same positive obligation of national 
authorities, the state’s failure to facilitate the prompt reunion of a parent with a child in 
cases of abduction by the other parent is contrary to the parent’s right to respect for his 
or her family life. Indeed, the Strasbourg Court will usually find a breach of Article 8 if 
it concludes that national authorities have failed to locate the child, to restore the rights 
that were restricted and to penalise the parent who unlawfully removed and retained the 
                                                 
54
 Hoffmann v. Austria, 255-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 30-36 (1993) (holding that the withdrawal of 
parental rights previously granted to the mother based on the mere fact that she was a member of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses constituted a violation of Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14). See also, 
mutatis mutandis, Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 29-43. By contrast see Ismailova 
v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R.  §§ 62-63 (2007) (considering that the reasoning of the domestic courts showed 
that they were focused solely on the interest of the children and therefore finding no violation of Articles 
8 and 14).   
55
 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. § 36 (finding that the national court 
awarding the custody to the mother made a distinction based on considerations regarding the father’s 
sexual orientation, which was not acceptable under the Convention). 
56
 Hokkanen v. Finland, 299-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 58-62 (1994). See also Sophia Gudrun Hansen v. 
Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 101-109 (2003) (concluding that the national authorities “failed to make 
adequate and effective efforts to enforce the applicant’s access rights to her children and thereby violated 
her right to respect for her family life”, §108). 
57
 See Glaser v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 86-87 (2000); Nuutinen v. Finland, 2000-VIII Eur. 
Ct. H.R. §§ 130-138. 
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child. In addition, when assessing the compliance with Article 8 in this context, the 
European Judge has analysed whether States have acted in conformity to the obligations 
concerning the prompt return of an abducted child enshrined in the Hague Convention 
on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 25 October 1980.58 
For example, in Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, concerning the unlawful removal 
of the applicant’s two daughters by their father, the Court found that national authorities 
had failed to “make adequate and effective efforts” to facilitate the execution of the 
domestic court’s order and thereby to enforce the mother's right to the return of her 
children, which breached her right to respect for her family life.59  
The Strasbourg Court has likewise underlined that in cases of this kind, having 
regard to the damaging and irremediable consequences that the passage of time will 
bring on the parent-child relationship and also in compliance with Article 11 of the 
Hague Convention, the national authorities must take all the measures that could 
reasonably be expected and that they must do so “without delay”.60  
In Maire v. Portugal, the Court held that the four years and six months length of 
time that had elapsed between the moment that the applicant’s request for returning the 
child was transmitted to the Portuguese authorities and the location of the child “placed 
the applicant in an unfavourable position, particularly with the child being so young”.61 
In the instant case, the Strasbourg Court further stated “that each Contracting State must 
equip itself with an adequate and sufficient legal arsenal to ensure compliance with the 
                                                 
58
 See, among others, Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. § 95; Iglesias Gil and A.U.I. v. 
Spain, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. § 51; Sylvester v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 57 (2003); Maire v. Portugal, 
2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 72. See also Bajrami v. Albania, 2006-XIV Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 66-68, where the 
Court found a breach of Article 8 on the basis of the failure to ratify the Hague Convention. 
59
 Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. § 113. By contrast, see Volesky v. Czech Republic, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 116-125 (2004) (finding no violation of Article 8, as the national authorities, according to 
the Court, took all the measures that could reasonably have been expected of them in order to enforce the 
right of access in respect of the applicant’s son) and also Mihailova v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 84-102 
(2006). 
60
 See Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. § 102; Sylvester v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 60 
(2003). 
61
 Maire v. Portugal, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 77. See also, inter alia, Monory v. Romania and Hungary, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 82-83 (2005) (underlying that “in matters pertaining to the reunification of children with 
their parents, the adequacy of a measure is also to be judged by the swiftness of its implementation, such 
cases requiring urgent handling, as the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for the 
relations between the children and the parent who does not live with them” and recalling that “the 
interests of the child are paramount in such cases”) and Kříž v. Czech Republic, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 89, 92, 
93 (2007) (where the Court, in order to find a breach of Article 8, took account of the lapse of time 
between the application for the enforcement of the decision granting the applicant a right of contact in 
1994 and the first meeting between the applicant and his son in 2001, when the child was nearly ten years 
old). 
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positive obligations imposed on it by Article 8 of the Convention and the other 
international agreements it has chosen to ratify”.62 
Finally, it should be noted that, according to the Court, “the national authorities’ 
obligation to take measures to facilitate reunion is not absolute, since the reunion of a 
parent with children who have lived for some time with the other parent may not be able 
to take place immediately and may require preparatory measures to be taken”.63 It 
further added that “the nature and extent of such preparation will depend on the 
circumstances of each case, but the understanding and co-operation of all concerned are 
always an important ingredient” and, accordingly, “whilst national authorities must do 
their utmost to facilitate such co-operation, any obligation to apply coercion in this area 
must be limited since the interests as well as the rights and freedoms of all concerned 
must be taken into account, and more particularly the best interests of the child and his 
or her rights under Article 8 of the Convention”.64 
 
4. Children in public care 
According to the well established case-law of the European Court, “the mutual 
enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental 
element of family life, and domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an 
interference with the right protected by Article 8 of the Convention”.65 Consequently, 
the compulsory taking of children into public care, their placement in homes or with 
foster families or even their freeing for adoption and the contact restrictions constitute 
interferences with the right to respect for family life and may entail a violation of 
Article 8, unless they are “in accordance with the law”, pursue a “legitimate aim” and 
can be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”.    
The Strasbourg Court makes a distinction between normal interferences (e.g., the 
temporary taking of children into public care), supplementary interferences (e.g., 
                                                 
62
 Maire v. Portugal, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 76.  
63
 Sophia Gudrun Hansen v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 98 (2003). See also Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, 
2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. § 94. 
64
 Sophia Gudrun Hansen v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 98 (2003). See also Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, 
2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. § 94. 
In general, on this subject see, inter alia, HARRIS, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN, supra 3, at 392-4, 408, 409, 
555; Nicole Gallus, La séparation du couple, in LE DROIT DE LA FAMILLE À L’ÉPREUVE DE LA 
CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, 55, 62-87 (F. Krenc and M. Puéchavy, ed., 
Bruylant, 2008); DIJK, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra 3, at 697-8; GOMIEN, SHORT GUIDE, supra 91, at 
85-6; SUDRE, DROIT EUROPÉEN, supra 3, at 438-9.   
65
 See, among others, Johansen v. Norway, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. § 52; K. and T. V. Finland, 2001-VII 
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 151. 
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restriction of access rights) and extremely harsh interferences (e.g., the taking of a new-
born baby into public care at the moment of its birth). The Court’s scrutiny will be, 
therefore, intensified and more rigorous when supplementary restrictions or drastic 
measures are at stake.   
Furthermore, the European Court has consistently stressed that, even though the 
taking into public care of a child may be considered legitimate, such measure should be 
regarded as temporary, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and should 
be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the family.66 In this regard, according to 
this organ, a fair balance has to be struck between, on one hand, the interests of the child 
remaining in care and, on the other hand, those of the parent in being reunited with the 
child.67 In carrying out this balancing exercise, the best interests of the child must be the 
paramount consideration and, thus, may override those of the parent.68 
For instance, in K.A. v. Finland, the Strasbourg Court found that Article 8 had 
been breached, since it could not discern “any serious and sustained effort on the part of 
the social welfare authority directed towards facilitating a possible family 
reunification”.69  
In order to be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” care measures 
must be based on relevant and sufficient reasons, that is to say strong presumptions that 
the children are suffering from violence and maltreatment70 or sexual abuses71, or that 
the parent is incapable of managing the children and their upbringing due to mental 
illness or personality disorder72. Nevertheless, if neither the parents’ capacity to bring 
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 See, e.g., Olsson (No.1) v. Sweden, 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 81 (1988); Johansen v. Norway, 1996-
III Eur. Ct. H.R. § 78; K. and T. v. Finland, 2001-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 178; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002-I 
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 76. 
67
 See, e.g., Haase v. Germany, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 93. 
68
 See, e.g., Johansen v. Norway, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. § 78; K. and T. v. Finland, 2001-VII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. § 156. 
69
 K.A. v. Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 142 (2003). See also K. and T. v. Finland, 2001-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 
164 (finding that, despite evidence of an improvement in the situation which had led to the care orders – 
the mother’s mental illness –, there was no serious effort in order to put an end to public care and, 
therefore, a fair balance between the interests involved was not stroke and this constituted a violation of 
Article 8). 
70
 For example, in Gnahoré v. France, 2000-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., the Court found that the taking of the child 
into public care, the suspension of the applicant's right to contact and to the restrictions imposed on that 
right during the relevant period were justified by the risk of violence and maltreatment carried out by the 
father, as the child was admitted to the hospital with serious bodily wounds and scars.  
71
 For instance, in Covezzi and Morselli v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), care measures were authorized on 
the grounds that the children had been subjected to sexual abuse by certain members of the family. 
72
 By way of example, in Scozzari and Giunta the suspension of the first applicant's parental rights and the 
temporary removal of the children from their mother's care were considered justified by the fact that the 
mother suffered from a personality disorder and, thus, was incapable of assuming her role as a parent.  
Also in P. c. and S. v. the United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., the newborn’s removal from her 
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up their children or the affection they bore them are at stake, the Court does not 
consider justified the most drastic care measure as the placement of children in public 
institutions on grounds of lack of resources (e.g. suitable and stable home or insufficient 
financial resources). In Wallova and Walla v. the Czech Republic, the Court held that 
national authorities should have had recourse to less drastic measures, like monitoring 
the applicants’ living conditions and hygiene arrangements and advising them what 
steps they could take to improve the situation and find a solution to their problems.73  
In what regards the proportionality assessment, the Strasbourg Court has also 
found that the removal of a newborn from its mother was a too extreme measure to be 
compatible to Article 8.74  
In addition, in these cases, the Court has held that the obligation to respect 
family life under Article 8 involves procedural guarantees. Thus, the domestic 
authority’s decision-making process must take into account, for instance, the parents 
point of view and interests, the social services reports, the children’s own wishes, if 
their age allows it.75 Accordingly, in order to guarantee the respect for family life, 
national authorities must properly involve parents in the decision-making process 
concerning their children and this may mean granting them direct access to the 
authorities’ file of protective care.76  
By way of example, in McMichael v. the United Kingdom, the Court concluded 
that, considering the failure to disclosure reports and other relevant documents during 
the domestic proceedings, the parents had not been “involved in the decision-making 
process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite 
protection of their interests” and, consequently, it found a breach of Article 8.77 Also, in 
Moser v. Austria, having regard to the fact that the applicant was only heard once by the 
                                                                                                                                               
mother at birth was due to the existing evidence that the mother may have had a propensity to harm her 
child, which was cause by psychiatric problems (Münchausen syndrome), although the Court concluded 
that this was a too extreme measure and hence violated Article 8. See also K. and T. v. Finland, 2001-VII 
Eur. Ct. H.R.; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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 Wallova and Walla v. the Czech Republic, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 74-75 (2006). 
74
 See K. and T. v. Finland, 2001-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 168; P. c. and S. v. the United Kingdom, 2002-VI 
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 116. 
75
 See, among others, W. v. the United Kingdom, 121 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 63 (1987); Couillard and 
Maugery v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 303 (2004). 
76
 In this sense, see SUDRE, DROIT EUROPÉEN, supra 3, at 437. See also T. P. and K. M. v. the United 
Kingdom, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R., where the Court emphasised “that it is essential that a parent be placed 
in a position where he or she may obtain access to information which is relied on by the authorities in 
taking measures of protective care” (§ 80) and further stated that “the positive obligation on the 
Contracting State to protect the interests of the family requires that this material be made available to the 
parent concerned, even in the absence of any request by the parent” (§82). 
77
 McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 307-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 87-93 (1995). 
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Juvenile Court, had no possibility to comment a report of social services and was not 
assisted by counsel in the proceedings before that Court, the European Court held that 
the parent was not sufficiently involved in the decision-making process.78    
Besides, in the Court’s point of view, parents may not be sufficiently involved in 
the decision-making process, if an excessive procedural delay is verified.79  
However, the European Court admits exceptions regarding the parents’ proper 
involvement in the decision-making process in exceptional circumstances,80 as those of 
an immediate threat to the child.81   
 
5. The right to respect for family life of prisoners 
Although any detention, lawful for the purposes of Article 5 of the Convention, 
entails by its nature an interference with one’s private and family life, the conventional 
organs consistently hold that it is an essential part of a prisoner’s right to respect for 
family life that the State assists him as far as possible in establishing and maintaining 
effective contact with his family and, in general, with people outside prison in order to 
facilitate the prisoners’ social rehabilitation.82  
In Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court held that, when 
assessing the scope of the State’s positive obligation under Article 8 in relation to prison 
visits, “regard must be had to the ordinary and reasonable requirements of imprisonment 
and to the resultant degree of discretion which the national authorities must be allowed 
in regulating a prisoner’s contact with his family”.83 In what concerns specifically the 
transference of a prisoner to prison closer home, as the European Commission asserted 
in Ouinas v. France, only in exceptional circumstances will the described State’s 
positive obligation extend to transferring a prisoner from one prison to another.84 
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 Moser v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 72 (2006). See also P. c. and S. v. the United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. 
Ct. H.R. § 137 (holding that the lack of legal representation during care and adoption proceedings and the 
lack of any real lapse of time between the two procedures deprived the applicants of being sufficiently 
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 For instance, in Covezzi and Morselli v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 132-139 (2003), this organ considered 
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 See K. and T. V. Finland, 2001-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 166. 
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 See Haase v. Germany, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 95. 
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 Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 131 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 74 (1988). See also Dikme v. 
Turkey, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 117. 
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The restrictions imposed on the number of visits to a prisoner or on the number 
of persons who may visit a prisoner or even on correspondence, the interdiction of visits 
or supervision over those visits, the subjection of a detainee to a special prison regime 
or special visit arrangements constitute, therefore, an interference with the right to 
respect for family life under Article 8.85 Such measures may be justifiable if they are “in 
accordance to the law” and are “necessary in a democratic society” in order to pursue a 
legitimate aim or aims, namely, for the “prevention of disorder or crime”, as required by 
paragraph 2 of the same provision. 
In what regards the “in accordance with the law” criterion, the contact limitation 
must be based on published, accessible, sufficiently clear and detailed provisions.86 
Thus, there may be a violation of Article 8 when national authorities have total 
discretion to limit or to exclude visits or correspondence from family members to 
prisoners.87 On the other hand, if guidelines for limiting visits by family members to 
particularly categories of prisoners, that is, if special prison regimes are promulgated, 
the Court may find no breach of Article 8 if the grounds laying under those regimes are 
particularly serious and the possibility of relaxing the restrictions exists.88 
As to the “necessity” criterion, these measures must correspond to a pressing 
social need and, in addition, must be proportionate to the legitimate aim they intend to 
achieve.89 When assessing the proportionality of the restriction of family visits, the 
European Judge takes into account, namely, the duration and range of those measures,90 
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 Klamecki v. Poland (No. 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. § 144 (2003). 
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 Gülmez v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 50-55 (2008).   
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 Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 157-162 (finding that the interference was not “in 
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 See Klamecki v. Poland (No. 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. § 152 (2003) (concluding that, having regard to the 
duration and the nature of the restrictions on the applicant's contact with his wife, who had also been 
charged with a related criminal offence, the absolute prohibition of contact between them for one year 
was disproportionate to the aim pursued). 
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the reason for the detention91 and the seriousness of what is at stake for the prisoner in 
question.92 Nevertheless, in this organ’s point of view, an absolute prohibition of visits 
will only be justifiable in exceptional circumstances.93  
Regarding “conjugal visits”, despite noting with sympathy the reformative 
movement in several European Countries towards the improvement of the imprisonment 
conditions and the possibilities for detained persons of continuing their conjugal life to a 
limited extent94, the Strasbourg organs have repeatedly stressed that the right to family 
life under Art 8 does not encompass the right for convicted prisoners to enjoy “conjugal 
visits” with their spouses.95 Indeed, the refusal of conjugal visits to the detained spouse, 
in spite of amounting to an interference with the right to respect for family life, may 
“for the present time”96 be regarded as justified for the prevention of disorder and crime 
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 8 and thus cannot constitute at the same 
time a breach of Article 12, the conventional provisional which grants protection to the 
right to marry.97 
                                                 
91
 As Donna Gomien rightly observes, “those serving criminal sentences generally have less protection 
than those detained for other purposes permitted under Article 5 of the Convention”. See DONNA GOMIEN, 
SHORT GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 85 (Council of Europe Publishing 
2005) [hereinafter GOMIEN, SHORT GUIDE]. See, e.g., Nowicka v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 73-77 (2002), 
(holding that restricting visits to one per month where the applicant was detained for a total period of 
eighty-three days for the purposes of compelling compliance with a lawful court order and did not contest 
the grounds for the detention entailed a breach of Article 8).  
92
 See Ploski v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 36-39 (2002) (finding that the refusal to grant the applicant a 
temporary release to attend the funerals of his parents violated Article 8). See also and in contrast 
Marincola and Sestito v. Italy, App. No. 42662/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999) and Georgiou v. Greece, App. 
No. 45138/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000). See also Togher v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 28555/95, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (1998) (considering that an enforced separation of a mother from her baby in prison as a 
consequence of her categorization as a security prisoner may also engage Article 8). 
93
 Lavents v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 141 (2002). 
94
 See, inter alia, X. and Y. v. Switzerland, App. No. 8166/78, 13 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 241, 
243 (1978); E.L. H. and P.B. H. v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 32094/96 and 32568/96, 91-B Eur. 
Comm’n H.R.  Dec. & Rep. 61, 64; Aliev v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 188 (2003). In fact, in Dickson v. 
the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 81 (2007), the Court observed that more than half of the Contracting 
States allowed conjugal visits in prison. 
95
 See X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 3603/68, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1970) (where the 
applicant was refused permission to receive visits from his wife over weekends in order to maintain their 
marital life). See also, mutatis mutandis, Aliev v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 188-189 (2003). 
96
 This expression used by the Court in Aliev v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 188 (2003) suggests, as rightly 
points out Alistair Mowbray, that this organ seems to be willing to change its approach regarding this 
mater in the future. See ALISTAIR MOWBRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 785 (Oxford University Press, 2007).   
97
 See X. and Y. v. Switzerland, App. No. 8166/78, 13 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 241, 243 and 244 
(1978); E.L. H. and P.B. H. v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 32094/96 and 32568/96, 91-B Eur. 
Comm’n H.R.  Dec. & Rep. 61, 64. 
For more details on the respect for family life of prisoners see, inter alia, HARRIS, LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN, supra 3, at 395, 408, 409, 555; DIJK, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra 3, at 715-9; GOMIEN, 
SHORT GUIDE, supra 91, at 85; Manuel Lezertua Rodríguez, Los derechos de los reclusos en virtud del 
Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, in EGUZKILORE – CUADERNO DEL INSTITUTO VASCO DE 
CRIMINOLOGÍA, 135, 145-153 (Instituto Vasco de Criminología, 1998).  
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In this context, mention should also be made to the case Dickson v. the United 
Kingdom, where the Court’s Grand Chamber sustained that the refusal of access to 
artificial insemination facilities to the applicants, who were both detained, did not strake 
a fair balance between the competing public and private interests involved and, 
accordingly, violated Article 8.98 
 
6. The right to respect for family life of immigrants 
Every person who is under the jurisdiction of a State-party to the ECHR may 
rely on the protection afforded by this instrument (Article 1 ECHR). Thus, also the 
foreigners who claim to be affected by a measure issued from a State-party may address 
an application to the Eur. Ct. H.R 
Article 8 is an important limit to the immigration policies of States Parties99. The 
Eur. Ct. H.R. has stressed that the measures of exclusion and deportation of aliens may 
interfere with an existing family life, since such decisions might result in the separation 
of the members of the family100.  
Therefore, Article 8 can be a ground for controlling both a refusal of family 
reunification and a decision of deportation. In the former situation, the State might have 
the positive obligation to admit the entry of a foreign family member into the territory. 
In the latter case, the State might be prevented from deporting an alien if the deportation 
amounts to a disruption of the family living in the territory.  
However, the Court has continuously held that Article 8 does not guarantee the 
right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular country. This is because of the 
general principle of international law whereby States have the sovereign power to 
control immigration, and broad discretionary in such context. The extent of a State’s 
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 See Dickson v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 77-85 (2007). 
99
 In general, on the respect for family life of the immigrants, see Ana Rita Gil, Um Caso de 
Europeização do Direito Constitucional Português – a Afirmação de um Direito Fundamental ao 
Reagrupamento Familiar, REV. DIREITO PÚBLICO 2 (2009); Hélène Lambert, The European Court of 
Human Rights and the Right of Refugees and Other Persons in Need of Protection to Family Reunion , 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 11, (1999), P. Van Dijk, Protection of «Integrated» Aliens against Expulsion under 
the European Convention on Human Rights, in IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY IN EUROPE, 
(Kluwer Law International, 2001) Cynthia S. Anderfuhren-Wayne, Family Unity in Immigration and 
Refugee Matters : United States and European Approaches, INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 8 (1996), Jen Vedsted-
Hansen, Migration and the Right to Family and Private Life, in MONDIALISATION, MIGRATION ET DROITS 
DE L’HOMMME : LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN QUESTION (Bruylant, 2007). 
100
 In 1963, the Eur. Comm’n H.R. has stressed: « in certain circumstances, refusals to give certain 
persons access to, or allow them to take up residence in, a particular country, might result in the 
separation of such persons from the close members of their family which could raise serious problems 
under Article 8 of the Convention » X. v. Denmark App. No. 1855/63, 8 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 200204 
(1965).  
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obligation to admit into its territory foreign relatives or to refrain from expelling 
immigrants will vary according to the particular circumstances of the persons involved 
and the general interest.  
The Eur. Ct. H.R. has so far took the position that the decisions on deportation 
must be under a stricter scrutiny than the decisions refusing family reunification101. 
Regarding the latter, the Court considers that they only lead to a violation of Article 8 if 
the family does not have the chance to be reunited in a country connected with either of 
the members102. In Gül case, the applicant was a Turkish national who lived in 
Switzerland with a temporary residence permit on humanitarian grounds with his 
seriously ill wife and their daughter. The Swiss authorities refused to allow his two 
sons, who had remained in Turkey, to join them. The Court considered that no 
interference in the family life had occurred because there were no obstacles preventing 
the family from being reunited in Turkey103.  
The Court’s approach to family reunification issues changed in 2000. In two 
cases the decisions of refusal of family reunification were considered a breach to Article 
8104. In both of them the applicants had asked for the reunification of their children and 
had other children deeply integrated in the host country. The Court considered that these 
children would suffer strong hardship in case of removal of the entire family to the 
country of origin of the parents. Therefore, besides the protection of the family unity, it 
was also the principle of the best interest of the child that played an important role in 
these cases. 
The Court has adopted a more liberal approach towards non-citizens already 
present in the territory of a member-state seeking not to be removed from there. The 
Court holds that the State, when deciding a deportation measure, has to strike a fair 
balance between the applicants’ interests on the one hand and its own interest in 
controlling immigration on the other. They have to strike such a balance in order to 
justify that the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” in light of Article 8 
(2). In order to determine whether the States have struck a fair balance between these 
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 That is because the refusals of family reunification are considered positive obligations, in which the 
States have a broader margin of appreciation.  
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 The Eur. Comm’n H.R. has also stressed: “If the only legal residence which they can find is in a 
country unconnected with either of them, might constitute a violation of Article 8º”. See X & Y v. United 
Kingdom, application 5301/71, §82, Coll. 43 (1973). p. 82. 
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 Gül v. Switzerland, 1996-I 3 Eur. Ct. H.R.. In the case Ahmut v. the Netherlands, 1996-VI 24 Eur. Ct. 
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 Case Sen v. the Netherlands 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R and Tuquabo-Tekle and others v. the Netherlands 
2005 Eur. Ct. H.R.  
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two competing interests, the Court takes into account several aspects. They were 
summarized in the Boultif105 and Üner106 cases. The Court analyses the existing 
personal and family life of the alien and the solidity of social, cultural and family ties 
with the host country107, the nationalities of the various persons concerned, and the 
situation of the alien’s family108. The regular or irregular situation of the alien in the 
country is also to be considered. Besides, the Court takes in consideration the remaining 
ties with the country of origin. It assesses the possibility of transferring the family life in 
the country to which the alien is to be expelled and the seriousness of the difficulties 
which the family members are likely to encounter therein. Where the alien is being 
deported for having committed a crime, the Court analyses the nature or seriousness of 
the offence committed, and the time elapsed since the offence and the alien’s conduct 
during that period.  
An important factor which is always taken into account is whether there are 
children involved, their age and their socialization in the host country. The best interests 
and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which 
they are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled are of 
the utmost importance, according to the principle of the best interest of the child109. The 
Court takes into account the age of the children concerned, their situation in the country 
of origin and the extent to which they are dependent on their parents110. 
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 Üner v. Netherlands, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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of immigration (Moustaquim v. Belgium, 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991)), whether he or she has 
studied or worked in the host country (Keles v. Germany, 2005, Eur. Ct. H.R.), the acquisition of the 
nationality of the host country (El Boujaïdi v. France, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R (1997-VI)), amongst other factors 
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Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 21 (1988). 
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 The case Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. The Netherlands (2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R) is particularly 
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also, mutatis mutandis, Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 21 (1988). 
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These principles apply regardless of the legality of the alien’s stay in the host 
country or the nationality of the family members.  
Despite its case-by-case approach and its restrictiveness regarding positive 
obligations, the Eur. Ct. H.R. has made a decisive contribution for the protection of the 
family unity of the immigrants. Nowadays almost all immigration laws in Europe 
require that administrative authorities take into account the principle of family unity in 
their decisions.  
The protection afforded against family disruption in immigration context by the 
Eur. Ct. H.R. is more developed that the one afforded by the Supreme Court of United 
States. This latter relies on the plenary power doctrine – a doctrine rooted in sovereignty 
that gives the legislative and executive branches of government broad and exclusive 
authority to regulate immigration matters111. It is true that U.S. immigration law 
provides some opportunities for discretionary relief from deportation for aliens, 
especially for those who have substantial ties to the United States. They can prove to an 
immigration judge that the negative aspects of their conviction were outweighed by 
their U.S. connections. Nevertheless, though these remedies have similarities to the 
European approach of balancing the interests, in practice they are not easy to obtain. For 
example, the hardship that separation from a parent or enforced deportation from one’s 
home country entails is not considered sufficient to enable the parent of a citizen child 
to resist removal112. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The case-law of the Eur. Ct. H.R has developed new meanings of the Article 8 
ECHR, far beyond what mere reading of this provision would suggest. Thus, Article 8 
nowadays protects the family unity in several dimensions whenever it is threatened by a 
State measure.  
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 In this context, the case Fiallo v. Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977) is a leading case. It involved a 
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The case-law analysis carried out in this paper concerning custody and access 
allowed us to conclude that, although a wide margin of appreciation may be granted to 
Member States in this field, the respect for family life will not be considered to be 
violated if parents’ procedural rights are safeguarded, if the equality principle is 
respected, if good faith efforts to enforce access arrangements are made and if a fair 
balance between the conflicting interests is made. 
In what regards public care measures, the State’s margin of appreciation seems 
to be narrower and the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. Article 8 
will not be breached, e. g., if care measures are based on relevant and sufficient reasons 
and the parents’ procedural guarantees are safeguarded. 
In relation to the right to family life of prisoners, the Courts approach 
concerning in particular “conjugal visits” seems to be excessively severe and, 
considering that more than half of the Contracting States allow conjugal visits in prison, 
an evolutive interpretation should be expected in the future. 
Regarding the immigrants, the case-law of the Eur. Ct. H.R represents an 
important development in an area that was traditionally ruled exclusively by the States’ 
interests and policies, for it stressed that all decisions regarding immigration and 
deportation must take into account the family life of the alien. Interferences with the 
family life are only legitimate if they were preceded by a balancing between the 
interests of the State mentioned on the paragraph 2 of Article 8 and the interests of the 
immigrant.  
In short, despite not protecting the family unity in an absolute fashion, the case-
law of the Eur. Ct. H.R represents a strong contribution for the widespread respect of 
the family as the basic and sacred unity of the human society. It shows that family can 
not be arbitrarily disrupted by State measures, even where such measures are justified 
by public interests of the utmost importance.  
 
 
 
